bola virus disease (EVD) -previously known as Ebola haemorrhagic fever -is a severe, often fatal illness of humans. The disease first appeared in 1976 in two simultaneous outbreaks in South Sudan (formerly part of Sudan) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaïre). 1 The origin of the virus is unknown, but fruit bats are considered the likely reservoir of the Ebola virus.
2,3
Initial symptoms include fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache and sore throat followed by vomiting and diarrhoea. EVD can result in hepatic damage, renal failure, terminal shock and multiorgan dysfunction.
2,4,5
The case fatality rate associated with previous EVD outbreaks has been between 25% and 90%;
2,3,6-12
the rate associated with the current outbreak in West Africa -the largest ever recorded -is estimated to be 60-70%. 12 Children aged less than five years, the elderly and pregnant women are particularly vulnerable.
5
Appropriate clinical management has been shown to improve survival.
13
Risk posed by the Ebola epidemic to the The Ebola virus is detectable at low levels in the blood of an infected case at the time of symptom onset; however, it may take up to three days of illness for virus levels to reach reliably detectable levels. The viral load increases logarithmically during the acute phase of illness and decreases during clinical recovery. Bodies of deceased EVD patients remain highly viraemic and hence are highly contagious. Ebola virus has been detected in other body fluids such as semen, breast milk and saliva during the acute and convalescent phase of illness.
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Exposure assessment
As of March 2015 the EVD outbreak was contained in West Africa with only three EVD cases having being infected outside of this region. All cases infected in nonWest African countries had clear epidemiological links to the outbreak in West Africa.
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Importation of EVD into the Pacific would require an infected traveller to arrive in the Pacific undetected. There is very limited travel and/or trade links between West Africa and the Pacific, suggesting that the likelihood of a traveller, let alone a traveller who has been in direct contact with the blood or body fluids of an EVD-infected case, arriving in the Pacific is very low. There is no direct flight from West Africa to the Pacific; passengers are required to transit a minimum of three major international airports. Therefore an infected traveller would have to pass through several airport and airline EVD surveillance procedures undetected before reaching the Pacific the public health risk posed by a threat to inform actions based on the level of risk, resource availability, competing health priorities and other context considerations. 15 The objective of this risk assessment was to estimate the likelihood of EVD importation into Pacific island countries and areas and to assess the magnitude of public health and societal impact should a case be imported. 
METHOD
15
The risk assessment was conducted by experienced specialists in public health surveillance and response, epidemiology and virology; all have experience in public health in Pacific island countries and areas. This includes experience in monitoring IHR (2005) core capacities in the Pacific.
14 Their findings were reviewed by a broader group of WHO experts with expertise in laboratory methods, epidemiology, infectious diseases, risk communication and emergency planning.
Scientific literature about the epidemiology of the Ebola virus and the current Ebola epidemic was collected from co-authors, WHO situation reports and through MEDLINE.
RESULTS
Hazard assessment
EVD is a severe, often fatal, illness readily transmitted from an infected human if adequate personal protective measures are not in place; it is believed there is no risk of transmission before symptom onset. 2 The incubation period for EVD is two to 21 days.
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the resulting protective influence these actions have on risk of EVD importation into Pacific island countries and areas.
While the likelihood of a symptomatic or asymptomatic EVD-infected person arriving in the Pacific and evading all screening mechanisms on route is very low, it is possible. The capacity of Pacific island countries and areas to detect and respond to EVD in the community and to undertake the associated communitybased public health control measures required (e.g. contact tracing, risk communication) varies between states but in general is limited. All Pacific island countries and areas are enhancing preparedness for EVD; however, existing resource and workforce limitations, geographic isolation and limited communication infrastructures, and logistic constraints pose major barriers to achieving event readiness in a short time frame.
Results of a survey of Member States in the WHO Western Pacific Region (of which 14 are Pacific island countries) conducted in October 2014 aimed to assess states' preparedness to respond to EVD. The survey highlighted that achieving the necessary core capacities in Pacific island countries (and areas) is difficult. The survey found that four (31%) of the 13 Pacific island countries that responded reported not yet having a health care facility designated to isolate suspected or confirmed cases of EVD. Further, only two (15%) reported having adequate supplies of PPE in country for EVD rapid response and containment operations. The survey reported that awareness of the EVD situation was high and that the governments of all Pacific island countries were monitoring the global situation; however, few (n = 4; 31%) had conducted countryspecific risk assessments. Nine (69%) surveyed Pacific island countries self-reported having adequate early warning surveillance systems to detect potential EVD; however, only four (31%) reported having EVD-specific investigation protocols developed or having trained rapid response teams in EVD response procedures.
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Globally, governments, airlines and major international travel hubs are conducting surveillance for EVD (including exit health screening in affected countries) in a concerted effort to stop the global spread of the disease. International airports in the Pacific have introduced EVD-specific health and travel history declaration cards to screen arriving passengers, have islands. Airport-based and airline EVD surveillance includes collecting information about travellers' health (to detect potential symptomatic EVD-infected travellers) and their recent travel history (to identify travellers who have been to an EVD-affected country and may have been exposed regardless of symptom status). Patients travelling for medical care are unlikely to choose a route that passes through the Pacific, rather seeking care in countries within direct flight reach (i.e. United States of America, European or African countries). 
Health
17,24,25
Context assessment
Context assessment examines setting-related factors that influence the vulnerability of the population to health impacts associated with a hazard. 15 For EVD, capabilities to implement prevention, preparedness and control measures to decrease the level of risk are pertinent. The assessment was undertaken in the context of the broader global public health response to the EVD epidemic and societal consequences could be major. Building core IHR (2005) and EVD-specific capacities in surveillance, infection prevention and control and outbreak response is warranted and will help to strengthen all-hazards alert and response capacities in the Pacific region.
DISCUSSION
Although the likelihood of EVD importation into the Pacific is low, this risk assessment highlights that Pacific island countries and areas need to assess and enhance their core public health capacities to be able to effectively detect and respond to suspected or confirmed EVD cases. EVD preparedness should focus on the capacities outlined in WHO's Framework for Action on Ebola, 28 which include:
command and control, surveillance, risk assessment and response, laboratory, clinical management and infection prevention and control, public health interventions (including those at international points of entry) and risk communication. As these capacities are required for most public health emergency responses, efforts for an EVDspecific threat should have long-term value by enhancing an all-hazards approach to public health preparedness in line with the IHR (2005).
While it is important to address all capabilities in the Framework for Action on Ebola, an immediate EVD risk communication messages displayed in airport arrival halls, and have mechanisms in place to isolate and interview sick travellers. Such efforts further reduce the risk of importation of EVD into the Pacific.
Access to laboratory facilities able to test for EVD is limited in Pacific island countries and areas. The closest laboratories able to test for EVD are the Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory in Melbourne, Australia (preliminary testing only) and the WHO Collaborating Centre Laboratory at the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, USA (definitive testing). 27 The time required to transport specimens to these facilities range from one to seven days; therefore, health authorities will need to initially act based on a clinical diagnosis.
Risk characterization
The information from the risk characterization (summaries in Table 1 ) suggests that the likelihood of EVD importation into the Pacific is very low, especially as the outbreak Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone is stabilizing. However, if it were to occur, the existing gaps in surveillance, response and infection prevention and control capacity in many Pacific island countries and areas would mean that both the public health and broader This risk assessment has some limitations. As it was defined by the epidemiological and contextual situation at one point in time (in this case March 2015), it will need updating as the situation evolves or new information surfaces. The assessment applies to the Pacific region as a whole and did not assess variability in risk or capacity to respond for individual Pacific island countries or areas. Pacific islands are encouraged to build on this risk assessment by further exploring their jurisdictions' specific level of exposure, vulnerability and resilience to EVD. Finally, risk assessments, by their nature, are subjective; therefore, other risk assessments may have different outcomes.
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